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Abstract
Authentication ensures that system’s resources are not obtained fraudulently by illegal users. Pass-
word authentication is one of the simplest and the most convenient authentication mechanisms over
insecure networks. The problem of password authentication in an insecure networks is present in
many application areas. Since computing resources have grown tremendously, password authenti-
cation is more frequently required in areas such as computer networks, wireless networks, remote
login, operation systems, and database management systems. Many schemes based on cryptography
have been proposed to solve the problem. However, previous schemes are vulnerable to various at-
tacks and are neither efficient, nor user friendly. Users cannot choose and change their passwords at
will. In this paper, we propose a new password authentication scheme to achieve the all proposed
requirements. Furthermore, our scheme can support the Diffie–Hellman key agreement protocol over
insecure networks. Users and the system can use the agreed session key to encrypt/decrypt their
communicated messages using the symmetric cryptosystem.
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1. Introduction
Password authentication is one of the simplest and the most convenient authentication
mechanisms over insecure networks. It provides the legal users to use the resources of
the remote systems. Many Internet applications are based on password authentication, for
example, remote login, government organizations, private corporations, database manage-
ment systems, and school systems. However, the current Internet environment is vulnerable
to various attacks such as replay attack, guessing attack, modification attack, and stolen-
verifier attack. Therefore, a number of researchers have proposed several password authen-
tication schemes for secure login of legal users.
In traditional password authentication scheme, each user has an identifier (ID) and a
password (PW). If a user wants to login to a remote server, he/she submit his/her ID and
PW to the server. A simplest authentication approach is to store and maintain a password
table including users’ IDs and PWs in the remote server. Upon receipt of user’s ID and PW,
the remote server searches the password table to check whether or not the submitted ID and
PW match with those stored in the password table. Once the ID and PW match the corre-
sponding pair stored in the server’s password table, the user will be granted access to the
server’s facilities. Since the user’s password is stored in plain-text form in password table,
this approach is vulnerable to the revelation of the passwords. An intruder can impersonate
a legal user by stealing the user’s ID and PW from the password table. This attack is called
stolen-verifier attack. Besides, two disadvantages are found in this approach. One is that
the system load is very high. If a lot of users register with the system, the password table
will become big and hard to maintain. The other is an intruder can intercept a user’s ID
and PW from the Internet and then replay it later to login. This attack is called the replay
attack.
To prevent the password table from stealing by others, password is usually hashed or
encrypted inside the computer [8,26]. However, the transmission of unencrypted password
could be stolen by wire tap. Therefore, this scheme is still vulnerable to the replay at-
tack. To overcome this problem, Lamport proposed one-time password using one-way
hash function [19]. But there are three shortcomings in Lamport’s method. The first one
is the high hash overhead. The second one is the necessity for password resetting. Fi-
nally, a verification table should be stored in the server to verify the legitimacy of a
user. If an intruder can somehow break into the server, the contents of the verification
table can be modified easily. This is called modification attack. The attack also means
that an attacker can impersonate other legal users by constructing a valid login request
from an intercepted login request. Researchers have recognized this problem and proposed
solutions in which the verification table is no longer required in the server [15]. From
the Lamport’s method, Haller and Yeh derived S/KEY one-time password scheme [9,10]
and Yeh’s scheme, respectively [41]. Some researchers further pointed out that S/KEY
scheme is not secure [22]. To solve the above high hash overhead and password resetting
problems, Shimizu proposed the CINON protocol [32]. In 2000 and 2001, Sandirigama
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were intended to be superior to the Lamport’s protocol, CINON protocol, and the PERM
protocol [33], in terms of storage utilization, computing time, and transmission over-
head. In 2002, Chen and Ku proposed two stolen-verifier attacks on SAS and OSPA
protocol [3].
Generally speaking, there are three types of identity authentication methods [16,17]:
1. Identity authentication of something known, such as password.
2. Identity authentication of something possessed, such as smart cards.
3. Identity authentication of some personal characteristics, such as fingerprint.
Combining these methods can enhance the security level of a system. Usually, most sys-
tems use the first two methods to identify a user. Recently, many password authentication
schemes using smart cards have been proposed by some researchers [1,2,4,5,11,13–15,18,
20,30,31,34–37,39,40]. In these schemes, the smart-card-oriented remote login authenti-
cation scheme is used to authenticate a legitimate user. The smart card contains a micro-
processor, which can perform arithmetic operations quickly, an I/O port, a RAM, and a
ROM in which some messages are stored. Therefore, there is no need to store a password
table or verification table in the server.
In [2], Chang and Wu proposed a remote password authentication scheme with a smart
card based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). The scheme does not need to
store verification table and is secure against attacks of replaying previously intercepted
requests. However, the user’s password of this scheme cannot be chosen and changed
freely by the owner. A similar problem also occurs in some schemes proposed by [14,
30,34]. Chan et al. [1] and Shen et al. [30], respectively, further pointed out that Hwang
et al.’s scheme [14] is insecure. In [38], Yamaguchi et al. proposed a simple but efficient
authentication system, SPLICE/AS. Later, Hwang et al. pointed out that SPLICE/AS sys-
tem is vulnerable to the guessing attack [12]. In [37], Wu proposed an efficient scheme
based on the geometric Euclidean plane. The merits of this scheme are its simplicity of
geometry and the property that users can freely choose their own passwords. However, the
scheme is insecure as indicated in [11]. In [15], Jan and Chen proposed a new scheme
without verification table. Users can freely choose and change their own passwords in
the scheme. However, the scheme is not efficient because it uses the public key cryp-
tosystem. The computational cost is very high. In [39], Yang and Shieh proposed two
methods to prevent replay attack. Their schemes do not store passwords or verification
tables in the server, and let users freely change their own passwords. However, two pa-
pers [31,35] pointed out that Yang and Shieh’s schemes have a drawback in that an intruder
is able to impersonate a legal user by constructing a valid login request from an inter-
cepted login request. Therefore, Yang and Shieh’s schemes cannot prevent modification
attack. In 2002, Hwang et al. [13] and Chien et al. [4] proposed an efficient and practi-
cal smart-card-based schemes based on secure one-way hash function. In those schemes,
the authors claimed that their schemes can achieve the following characteristics: (1) the
verification or password tables are not required in the server; (2) the communication cost
and the computational cost is very low; (3) the replay attack problem is completely solved;
and (4) users can freely choose their passwords. However, in [13], their scheme cannot
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their passwords.
Although there are many smart-card-oriented schemes proposed to authenticate a le-
gitimate user, none of them can solve all problems. In these schemes, another important
problem is the lost smart card problem. If an intruder picks up a smart card lost by some
legal user, then he/she can impersonate the user to login the system by off-line guessing
the password of the card owner.
In this paper, we first propose the following ten requirements for evaluating a new
password authentication scheme. The ten requirements solve all problems in smart-card-
oriented schemes. Each requirement is an important and independent requirement for a
new password authentication scheme.
R1. The passwords or verification tables are not stored inside the computer.
R2. The password can be chosen and changed freely by the owner.
R3. The password cannot be revealed by the administrator of the server.
R4. The passwords are not transmitted in plain text on network.
R5. No one can impersonate a legal user to login the server.
R6. The scheme must resist the replay attack, guessing attack, modification attack, and
stolen-verifier attack.
R7. The length of a password must be appropriate for memorization.
R8. The scheme must be efficient and practical.
R9. The scheme can achieve mutual authentication. Not only can server verify the legal
users, but users can verify the legal server.
R10. The password cannot be broken by guessing attack even if the smart card is lost.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a new password authentication scheme to meet
the aforementioned ten requirements. In addition, our scheme is intended to be superior
to the SAS protocol and OSPA protocol in terms of storage utilization, computing time,
and transmission overhead. This paper is organized as follows. In next section, we present
a new password authentication scheme. In Section 3, our scheme is compared with other
methods. Finally, Section 4 presents our conclusions.
2. The new password authentication scheme
In this section, we present a new password authentication scheme using smart card and
show that our scheme can achieve all of the ten requirements described in Section 1.
2.1. Basic concepts
Our scheme employs some basic concepts, such as one-way hash function, e.g.,
MD5 [27], or SHA-1 [24], discrete logarithm problem [7], and Diffie–Hellman key agree-
ment protocol [6]. We briefly describe these basic concepts in this subsection.
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A one-way hash function h :a → b is a function with the following properties:
• The function h takes a message of arbitrary length as the input and produces a message
digest of fixed-length as the output.
• The function h is one-way in the sense that given a, it is easy to compute h(a) = b.
However, given b, it is hard to compute h−1(b) = a.
• Given a, it is computationally infeasible to find a′ such that a′ = a, but h(a′) = h(a).
• It is computationally infeasible to find any pair a, a′ such that a′ = a, but h(a′) = h(a).
2.1.2. Discrete logarithm problem
Until now, solving discrete logarithm problem is still a hard problem. We describe this
problem as follows. Assume that g is a generator of Z∗p and p is a large prime number.
Consider the following equation:
J = gj mod p. (1)
If we know g, j , and p, it is very easy to compute J . However, if we know g, J , and p, it is
very difficult to solve the equation for j . The difficulty is due to factoring prime numbers as
that required for RSA [28]. The problem of solving Eq. (1) for j is called discrete logarithm
problem.
2.1.3. Diffie–Hellman key agreement
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman proposed a key agreement scheme for making agreement
on a session key over insecure networks. The scheme allows two parties communicate
each other in a secure communication with the agreed session key. Its security is based on
solving discrete logarithm problem. Assume that Alice and Bob are to agree on a session
key over insecure networks. The parameters g and p are public. Then, they do the following
steps to agree on a session key.
• Alice randomly chooses a large number a and sends Bob A = ga mod p.
• In the meantime, Bob also randomly chooses a large number b and sends Alice B =
gb mod p.
• After that, Alice and Bob can calculate their session key as K = Ba mod p =
Ab mod p = gab mod p.
Without knowing a and b, no one can listen on the Alice–Bob channel. To derive a and b,
it is discrete logarithm problem.
2.1.4. The security of our proposed scheme
The security of our proposed scheme is based on having both the properties of dis-
crete logarithm problem and secure one-way hash function. Most password authentication
schemes are only based on one of these two properties. Recently, many schemes proposed
are based on the one-way hash function [4,21,29,34,41]. The computational complexity of
their schemes is superior to the discrete-logarithm-problem-based schemes. However, our
scheme is more secure than those based on one of the two problems. And it does not add
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Comparing with other schemes that have a verification table for storing encrypted user
passwords, our scheme let the server secretly keep only one value. The value is maintained
by the server. If the value is known to others, our scheme is destroyed. Therefore, the server
should maintain and store this value very securely.
2.2. Notations
The following notations are used throughout this paper.
• A denotes the user. A user of a computer system uses the authentication protocol to
login the host.
• S denotes the authentication server. A server takes charge of verifying legal users and
providing services to users.
• ID denotes the user identity.
• PW denotes the password of user A.
• x denotes the long secret key of S.
• p denotes a large prime number.
• g denotes the primitive element in Galois field GF(p).
• SR denotes the service request. It means a request by the user to login the server.
• R denotes a random number.
• T denotes the time stamp.
• h denotes a public one-way hash function with fixed-length output, e.g. MD5 or
SHA-1.
• ‖ denotes the concatenation.
• The expression “X → Y : M” represents the message M sent from X to Y through an
open channel.
• The expression “X ⇒ Y : M” represents the message M sent from X to Y through a
secure channel.
2.3. The scheme
Our scheme consists of three phases, namely, registration phase, login phase, and au-
thentication phase. In the registration phase, the server issues smart cards to the users who
request registration. Once the user registers with the server successfully, he/she can use the
resources of server through the login phase and authentication phase. In the login phase,
a user inserts his/her smart card to a terminal and keys in his/her identifier (ID) and pass-
word (PW). Then the terminal computes and sends a login request message to the remote
server. In the authentication phase, the remote server verifies the validity of the submitted
message and determines whether the login request should be accepted or not. The regis-
tration phase is done only once by the user when a new user wants to join the system. The
login phase and authentication phase are performed every time the user wants to login.
Now, we describe these three phases in turn.
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1. Choose ID, PW .
S
3. B = gh(x‖ID)+h(PW) mod p.
2. ID, h(PW)
4. ID, B , p, g


Fig. 1. Registration phase through secure channel.
2.3.1. Registration phase
In this phase, everyone who wants to register at the server would have a smart card.
The smart card is issued by the server or a United Card Issue Center (UCIC). Usually,
the UCIC is the server. User information stored on the card for certification includes id
number, name, parent’s name, address, birth-date, sex, and blood type, etc. [15]. As in [15],
the server which provides resources to the users would certify the validity of the card with
his signature. As to how to identify server signature, we will not discuss these functions
here.
Figure 1 shows the registration phase of the scheme. When a new user A wants to use the
resources of the system, he/she must do this phase first. The system is not responsible for
authenticating users except issuing smart cards to new users. Initially, the server first selects
a large prime number p and primitive number g in GF(p). Without loss of generality, p is
recommended to be 1024 bits at least. Besides, the server selects a secure one-way hash
function h(·) and a long secret key x maintained by himself/herself. Then the server keeps
x securely. The details of this phase is described in the following steps.
1. User A freely chooses his/her ID and PW . PW is a short password that is appropriate
for memorization.
2. A ⇒ S : ID, h(PW). A calculates h(PW) with his/her PW using one-way function h,
then sends the messages ID and h(PW) to the server S through a secure channel or by
hand.
3. After receiving the registration messages, S calculates B = gh(x‖ID)+h(PW) mod p.
4. S ⇒ A : ID,B,p,g. S issues A a smart card which contains ID, B , p, g, and then
sends this card to A through a secure channel.
2.3.2. Login phase
Upon login, user A attaches his/her smart card to his/her input device, and then keys in
his/her ID and PW to the device. Afterwards, the server and the smart card will perform
the following steps. Figure 2 shows the login phase of the scheme.
A
4. B ′ = (Bg−h(PW))R mod p.
Verify h(B ′) = h(B ′′).
C = h(T ‖ B ′).
S
2. B ′′ = gh(x‖ID)R mod p.
h(B ′′).
1. SR
3. h(B ′′),R
5. ID,C,T



Fig. 2. Login phase.
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2. After receiving the login service request, S calculates B ′′ = gh(x‖ID)R mod p, where
x is server’s secret key maintained by S, ID is A’s identity included in SR, and R is a
random number generated by S. Then S calculates h(B ′′) using secure one-way hash
function h.
3. S → A :h(B ′′), R. Server S then sends the hashed message h(B ′′) and the random
number R to A.
4. Upon receiving the messages, the smart card of A calculates B ′ = (Bg−h(PW))R mod p.
Then A can verify the validity of server S by checking whether the received message
h(B ′′) is equal to hashed B ′. If it is correct, A calculates C = h(T ‖B ′); otherwise, the
server is rejected and repeat the login phase. T is the time stamp of this login. T and
R can achieve one-time password and prevent from replaying attack. We will discuss
it in Section 2.5.
5. A → S : ID,C,T . A sends the login request messages (ID,C,T ) to S.
2.3.3. Authentication phase
This phase is executed by server S to determine whether user A is allowed to login or
not. Let T ′ be the time when S receives the login request messages. Upon receiving the
login request message, S executes the following steps to verify the validity of A.
1. Check if the format of ID is correct. If it is incorrect, S rejects the login request.
2. Compare T with T ′. If T ′ − T  ΔT , accept A’s login request; otherwise, reject it.
ΔT is the legal time interval for transmission delay. It can be used to prevent from
replaying attack.
3. Compute C′ = h(T ‖ B ′′), and then check whether C is equal to C′. If it is false, then
S rejects the login request; otherwise, S accepts the login request.
2.3.4. Change password
Our scheme allows users to freely change their passwords at will. Users do not need to
register the server again to change their password. Compare with some other schemes, our
scheme is more friendly. In some schemes, the password of a user has to be generated by
the server, and the user cannot change his/her password at will unless he/she re-registers
the sever again. On the other hand, for the purpose of security, each user should be allowed
to change his/her password periodically without worrying about the possible revelation of
the password, or excessive charges from the server for password changing. If a user wants
to change his/her password, he/she can insert his/her smart card in a terminal device and
enter newly chosen password PW ′ as in the following steps.
1. Select a new password PW ′.
2. Compute Y = gh(PW ′) mod p.
3. Compute Z = Bg−h(PW) mod p, where PW is the old password of the user and B is
from the card.
4. Compute β = YZ mod p.
5. Replace B with β in the smart card.
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2.4. Required storage and computational complexity
In some schemes, their system keeps a verification table in the server for storing en-
crypted user passwords. Assume that there are n users in the server. Then the amount
of space needed to store user identifiers and encrypted user passwords is O(n). In our
scheme, the server needs only to keep one secret value. Therefore, the space complexity of
our scheme for the server is O(1).
The computational complexity of our scheme is examined in the following. Let Th be the
time for executing the one-way hash function h. In registration phase, the time complexity
is (1 addition+1 exponentiation+1 modular operation). In login phase, the time complex-
ity is (5Th + 3 exponentiations + 2 modular operations + 1 generated random number + 2
multiplications). In authentication phase, the time complexity is (1Th + 1 comparison).
Besides, our scheme allows users to freely change their passwords at will. The time com-
plexity for changing password is (1 generated new password + 2 exponentiations + 2
multiplications + 3 modular operations).
2.5. Security analysis and discussions
In this section, we discuss the security and properties of our scheme.
1. In our scheme, no password or verification table is stored inside computer. There is
only one secret key x known and maintained by the server. This property can resist
the stolen-verifier attack and modification attack because no one can steal and modify
user passwords. Therefore, our scheme achieves the requirements 1 and 6 proposed in
the introduction.
2. In the registration phase of our scheme, the user password is chosen freely by the user,
not assigned by the server. Furthermore, the user can change his/her password at will.
This property achieves the requirement 2 proposed in the introduction.
3. We can see that the administrator of server does not know the password of the user
because it is protected by one-way function h(PW). This function has the property
that given a, it is easy to compute h(a) = b. However, given b, it is hard to compute
h−1(b) = a. This property achieves the requirement 3 proposed in the introduction.
4. The password of the user is not transmitted on network. Instead, h(B ′′) and C are trans-
mitted on network. Although these values include x, they are protected by one-way
function and discrete logarithms problem. If an attacker knows B ′′ and intercepts R,
given B ′′, R, g, and p, it is impossible to deduce x. The security is based on the dif-
ficulty of computing discrete logarithm over GF(p). In addition, x is also protected
by one-way function. In fact, the attacker does not know B ′′. If an attacker wants to
impersonate a user, he/she must know x. Therefore, this property achieves the require-
ments 4 and 5 proposed in the Introduction.
5. In our scheme, we assume that p is a large prime number. The security of our scheme
is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithm over GF(p). In [15], they
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operations on average to attack the password. Suppose a computer has computing
power of 1 million exponential operations per second, it needs 3.17 × 1086 years to
break the password. To improve the security of our scheme, the length of p can also
be set to 200 digits or over.
6. Our scheme also has one-time password property and can prevent the replay attack.
The password pattern (h(B ′′),C) is used only once in login phase. These messages
cannot be intercepted for reuse because they are generated using R and T with differ-
ent values for each login. On the other hand, the server can test if T ′ − T  ΔT to
prevent the replay attack. Hence, our scheme meets the requirement 6 proposed in the
Introduction.
7. Guessing attacks can be classified as on-line or off-line guessing attacks. The on-line
guessing attacks can be prevented easily by limiting the number of failed login. So it
will not be discussed here. In our scheme, if an intruder intercepts h(B ′′), R, C, and T ,
he/she cannot break PW by playing off-line guessing attacks because PW is protected
by both properties of one-way function and discrete logarithm problem. Furthermore,
even if the smart card is lost, off-line guessing attacks are still impossible to deduce
PW . A person, who picks up a lost smart card, may try to derive the password PW
from B = gh(x‖ID)+h(PW) mod p. Although he/she knows B , g, p, h( ), and ID, he/she
cannot derive PW without knowing x. This x is the long secret key maintained by
the server. Therefore, our scheme meets the requirements 6 and 10 proposed in the
Introduction.
8. If a masqueraded server wants to cheat the requesting user, he/she must prepare a valid
message (h(B ′′),R). However, it is impossible to compute h(B ′′) because he/she has
no way to derive the value h(x ‖ ID), due to the one-way property of the one-way hash
function and discrete logarithm problem. In addition, x is a long secret key maintained
by the server. Without knowing x, no one can forge the server to cheat the user. In our
scheme, not only can the server authenticate the user, but the user can authenticate the
server. This property achieves mutual authentication of the requirement 9 proposed in
the Introduction. In our scheme, an adversary may impersonate server to cheat users by
simply replaying a previously intercepted message (h(B ′′),R) or (h(B ′′ ‖ A),R,A).
That is, the proposed scheme cannot achieve mutual authentication as our claimed. To
resist replaying attack, we can add time-stamp to it.
9. A user can choose a short password for easy memorization in the registration phase.
Then the server will generate a long password pattern B using x and ID and place
ID, B , p, g, into the smart card issued to the user. The user needs only to remem-
ber the short password for using the smart card. The time complexity for the smart
card is not very high. It needs only two exponential operations and one hashing
operation. Our scheme can be applied to many applications, for examples, remote
login, e-government, e-commerce, database management systems, etc. Therefore, our
scheme meets the requirements 7 and 8 proposed in the Introduction.
10. In addition, our scheme can support the Diffie–Hellman key agreement protocol [6].
Figure 3 shows our modified login phase to support key agreement protocol. The reg-
istration phase is not modified. Once a user logins to the server successfully, he/she
can use the session key K = Aw mod p = Wa mod p = gaw mod p to encrypt/decrypt
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4. B ′ = (Bg−h(PW))R mod p
Verify h(B ′ ‖ A) = h(B ′′ ‖ A)
w: random number
W = gw mod p
C = h(T ‖ B ′ ‖ W)
S
2. B ′′ = gh(x‖ID)R mod p
a: random number
A = ga mod p
h(B ′′ ‖ A)
1. SR
3. h(B ′′ ‖ A), R, A
5. ID, C, W , T



Fig. 3. Modified login phase and Diffie–Hellman key agreement.
the transmitted messages between the user and the server using the symmetrical cryp-
tosystems such as DES [23] or AES [25]. During the authentication phase, the server
authenticates the user as follows. The Steps 1 and 2 are the same as those in the au-
thentication phase. In Step 3, the server computes C′ = h(T ‖B ′′ ‖W) and then checks
whether C is equal to C′. If it is false, then S rejects the login request; otherwise, S
accepts the login request.
11. The proposed scheme is potentially vulnerable to an insider attack. That is, the insider
of S can perform an off-line guessing attack on h(PW) to obtain PW . If succeeds, the
insider of S can try to use PW to impersonate users to login other servers employing
normal password authentication methods. In this case, our proposed scheme cannot
prevent it. However, in most schemes, the password of hashing table is encrypted by
the administrator of S. The insider of S cannot get h(PW) to obtain PW using an
off-line guessing attack.
3. Comparisons
In this section, we compare our scheme with other smart-card-based schemes using
the ten requirements for evaluating a new password authentication schemes proposed in
Section 1. Table 1 shows comparisons among smart-card-based schemes. It is easy to see
that our scheme can achieve all of the ten requirements. Therefore, our scheme is a bet-
ter password authentication scheme. Besides, our scheme can support the Diffie–Hellman
key agreement protocol over insecure networks. Users and the system can use the agreed
session key to encrypt/decrypt their communicated messages using the symmetric cryp-
tosystem. Notice that Chieh–Jan–Tseng scheme [4] and Hwang–Lee–Tang scheme [13] are
superior to other schemes except ours. Their schemes can achieve eight to nine out of ten
requirements. In addition, their schemes are very efficient because they use less one-way
hash functions. The computational costs are extremely low. Of course, their schemes can
be extended to achieve all requirements. However, the security of their schemes is not very
high because their schemes only base on one-way hash function. Hence, we proposed our
scheme based on both one-way hash function and discrete logarithm problem. The discrete
logarithm problem is still an open problem and is more secure than one-way hash function.
Comparing with their schemes, our scheme does not add too much computational com-
plexity. Furthermore, our scheme does not use complex public key cryptosystem. Here,
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Comparisons among the smart-card-based schemes
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
Our scheme Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Chang–Wu [2] N N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y
Wu [37] Y N Y Y N N Y Y N Y
Jan–Chen [15] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y
Yang–Shieh [39] Y Y N Y N N Y N N Y
Sun [34] N N N Y Y Y N Y N Y
Hwang–Li [14] N N N Y N N N N N Y
Hwang–Lee–Tang [13] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
Chieh–Jan–Tseng [4] Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Shen–Lin–Hwang [30] N N N Y Y Y N N N Y
Yeh–Shen–Hwang [41] N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y
Ri: Proposed requirements in Section 1; Y: supported; N: not supported.
we do not compare and evaluate computational costs of the proposed scheme and other
schemes because the proposed scheme is an ideal scheme to achieve all requirements. We
just show the scheme is superior to other schemes according to the ten requirements.
4. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have proposed a new password authentication scheme over inse-
cure networks. In terms of ten requirements for evaluating a new password authentication
schemes introduced in Section 1, our scheme is a better approach than the other schemes.
The primary merit of our scheme is in its simplicity and practicality for implementation
under insecure communication links. The advantages of our scheme are as follows:
1. Users can freely choose and change their passwords at will.
2. The verification table or password table is not stored inside the server computer.
3. It has one-time password property, which requires a different password in each trans-
action.
4. The security is based on having both properties of the discrete logarithm problem and
secure one-way hash function. Hence, it is more secure than those schemes based on
only one of these two properties.
5. Mutual authentication between the user and the server is provided.
6. It can withstand the guessing attack even though the smart card is lost.
A disadvantage of our scheme is that the server has to keep securely a secret value x. If the
value is known to the others, our scheme is destroyed.
In the future, in order to provide a higher security of password authentication scheme,
combining three types of identity authentication methods as described in Section 1 is a
good approach. We currently research on applying our scheme to identity authentication of
some personal characteristics.
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